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Abstract
Envy is often the cause of mutually harmful outcomes. We experimen-
tally study the impact of envy in a bargaining setting in which there is
no con
ict in material interests: a proposer, holding the role of residual
claimant, chooses the size of the pie to be shared with a responder, whose
share is exogenously xed. Responders can accept or reject the proposal,
with game types diering in the consequences of rejection: all four combi-
nations of (not) self-harming and (not) other-harming are considered. We
nd that envy leads responders to reject high proposer claims, especially
when rejection harms the proposer. Notwithstanding, maximal claims by
proposers are predominant for all game types. This generates con
ict and
results in a considerable loss of eciency.
JEL classication: D63, D74, C91, C72.
Keywords: Social Preferences, Con
ict, Experimental Economics, Bargaining.
Corresponding author.




Phone: +39 0461 283139
1
Jena Economic Research Papers 2011 - 0511 Introduction
Envy is undoubtedly a strong motivational force and often the reason for mu-
tually harmful con
ict outcomes. Envy may, of course, concern aspects which
cannot be changed, e.g. when we envy others' good looks, intellectual, artistic,
or physical capabilities. Here we do not focus on these aspects but on avoidable
dierences. As often in (experimental) economics, we rely on avoidable discrep-
ancies in monetary success. That such discrepancies trigger negative emotions
and reactions has inspired the concept of inequ(al)ity aversion (e.g., Loewenstein
et al., 1989; Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000), while some
theoretical studies postulated envy as the main reason for many experimental
ndings (e.g., Kirchsteiger, 1994; Levine, 1998).1
Here we are not mainly concerned with the denition of envy but rather with
how robust the observation of envy is. Feelings of envy, and negative reactions
triggered by them, are mainly observed in situations where deviating from equal
payos helps one party but harms the other. This is not true for the interaction
setting studied here (i.e., the Envy Game) where a proposer chooses | within
bounds, of course | how much both parties can earn together. A proposer
choosing a larger pie increases her residual without reducing the agreement
payo of the responder which is exogenously xed. This, however, may result
in an avoidable payo inequality. Do we observe envy in such a setting? Or,
alternatively, will responder participants be more eciency inclined and tolerate
the self-serving behavior by proposers since it increases the payo sum?
Previous experiments show that when the payo of the decision maker, who
can choose among alternative allocations for a counterpart, is xed, choices are
more in
uenced by eciency concerns than by envy (e.g., Charness and Rabin,
2002; Engelmann and Strobel, 2004). Gueth et al. (201x) support this nding
experimentally for the Generosity Game, in which the share of the proposer is
exogenously xed and the responder is the residual claimant. In this experiment
1To experience envy means to suer from being worse-o than others and not from payo
dierences per s e.
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In our experiment, the residual claimant is the proposer who chooses a pie
size from which the responder receives a xed share. The responder can either
accept or reject the choice of the proposer. We experimentally manipulate the
consequences that the choice of the responder has for her own payo and for
the payo of the proposer. Specically, a rejection choice can have negative
payo consequences for both, for none, or for only one of the two players. We
nd that envy plays an important role in shaping the behavior of responders,
who tend to reject \greedy" claims by the proposer. The frequent rejection of
large pies, when this is payo relevant, results in inecient outcomes. Thus,
envy may have detrimental social consequences even without con
ict over scarce
resources, in the sense that one can, to some extent, favor one party without
having to harm the other party.
In section 2.1, we dene the envy game formally and introduce its four
variants, implemented as four experimental games. After describing the details
of the experimental protocol and stating our main hypotheses in section 2, the




We investigate behavior in a two-player bargaining game, labeled Envy Game.
We refer to the proposer as Player X and to the responder as Player Y. The
decision process consists of two stages: in the rst stage, Player X chooses the
pie size  2 f 2 N :     g and Player Y is given a xed share
of the pie equal to , where 0 <  <  < 2 < . Player X is the residual
claimant receiving  . In the second stage, Player Y determines () 2 f0;1g,
with () = 0 meaning rejection and () = 1 meaning acceptance. When
() = 1, the payos directly follow from the decisions in the rst stage, with
3
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y = . When Player Y sets () = 0, the consequences of Player Y's choice
are experimentally manipulated. The rejection choice may be self-damaging
and/or other-damaging. When the choice is self-damaging, Player Y loses her
share  of  and earns nothing. When the choice is other-damaging, Player X
loses her share of  and earns nothing. By combining these two dimensions we
obtain the following four alternative game types.
 In game type (V )oice only, the payos are the same as for () = 1, i.e.,
all what happens is that Player X learns that Player Y has rejected her
choice of , meaning that Y can only voice her anger. Player Y's choice
is neither self-damaging nor other-damaging.
 In game type (I)mpunity, X's payo is equal to x =    . The payo
of Y is equal to y = (), so that in case of () = 0, Player Y earns
nothing. Y's choice is self-damaging but not other-damaging.
 In game type (P)unity, X's payo is equal to x = ()( ), while Y's
payo is equal to y = . Thus, when () = 0, Player X earns nothing.
Y's choice is not self-damaging but other-damaging.
 In game type (U)ltimatum, the payos of Y and X are dened by x =
()( ) and y = (), respectively. In case of () = 0, both players
earn nothing. Y's choice is both self-damaging and other-damaging.
Our game types relate to familiar modications of the Ultimatum Game,
where the proposer suggests how to share a given pie and the responder ac-
cepts or not the proposal. The subgame-perfect equilibrium or solution by once
repeated elimination of dominated strategies is for the proposer to oer the
smallest positive amount possible and for the responder to accept all positive
oers. However, individuals seem to be strongly in
uenced by equity concerns.
Typically, oers are between 30% and 50% of the endowment and oers smaller
than 20% are rejected in about half of the cases (Camerer, 2003).
4
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Zwick, 1995), only the payo of the proposer is equal to zero after a rejec-
tion, allowing responders to sanction unfair allocations without cost. Finally,
the relevance of \voice" is testied by Xiao and Houser (2005). In an ulti-
matum experiment in which responders can also communicate their feelings to
proposers, less rejections of unfair oers are observed than in a standard ulti-
matum experiment. Thus, pure \voice rejection" in the Ultimatum Game may
suce to express one's anger due to an unfair oer.
2.2 Behavioral Predictions
To generate some qualitative behavioral predictions for the four variants of
the Envy Game, we use a version of Charness and Rabin (2002)'s model of
distributional preferences.2 We distinguish four prototypical types in terms
of social preferences, namely selsh, dierence-averse, welfare-enhancing, and
competitive. First, we focus on Player Y whose behavior, unlike that of Player X,
is not aected by strategic considerations, but is genuinely driven by allocational
considerations. Behavioral predictions are obtained for all game types in which
rejection has real payo consequences.
A selsh Player Y is going to accept any  in game types I and U, where
rejection is self-damaging. This type of Player Y is indierent between ac-
ceptance and rejection in game types P and V , as rejection is either purely
other-damaging or payo irrelevant.
A dierence-averse Player Y is going to accept any   2 because her
welfare is positively aected by a higher payo for X in this region. However,
when  > 2 the predicted behavior of Y varies across experimental games. In
game type I, all choices of  are accepted, even if they create a disadvantageous
inequality for Y. In game type P, stronger envy should lead to a lower rejection
threshold in terms of . In contrast, a stronger sense of guilt should induce a
2See Appendix B for details about the model and for the derivation of behavioral predic-
tions.
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2 will be rejected. In game type U, whether  is accepted or rejected depends
only on envy: the stronger is envy, the smaller is the rejection threshold for .
For a Player Y inclined to enhance welfare, higher payos, both for herself
or for the other, are always desirable. Such a Player Y will thus accept any .
A competitive Player Y benets from an increase in her own payo and
suers from an increase in the payo of the other. In game type I, in which
rejection is purely self-damaging, a player of this type will accept any . In
game type P, any  will be rejected. In game type U, a Player Y is going to
accept any , with   2. However, when  > 2 rejections become likely.
In game type V , where punishment has no real consequences, it could be
argued that behavior should be close to behavior observed for game type P.
Players Y may still punish Players X although punishment is just symbolic. At
the same time, rendering the punishment payo irrelevant may add some noise
to the choices of Players Y, as testied by previous studies on the impact of real
incentives in experiments (e.g., Camerer and Hogarth, 1999).
Concerning Player X, the allocational preferences considered here predict
 =  for each game type. The full exploitation of residual claimant's rights
originates from the monotonicity assumption that underlies the model consid-
ered. However, when strategic considerations are taken into account, deviations
from  =  may be observed. In particular, smaller  sizes may be observed in
P and U, game types in which envy may induce Player Y to punish a \greedy"
Player X.
2.3 Participants and Procedures
The Experiment was run in Jena (Germany) at the laboratory of the Max
Planck Institute of Economics. The Participants were undergraduate students
of the Friedrich Schiller University of Jena recruited using the ORSEE system
3A dierence-averse player experiences envy when facing a disadvantageous allocation and
guilt when facing an advantageous allocation.
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using the z-Tree software (Fischbacher, 2007).
Upon their arrival at the laboratory, participants were randomly allocated
to cubicles inhibiting interaction with other participants. Participants were left
four minutes to read the instructions individually and after that instructions
were read aloud to establish common knowledge.4 Participants could privately
ask for clarications and had to answer a questionnaire checking their under-
standing of the instructions.
A total of 128 participants took part in the experiment, half of them ran-
domly assigned to role X and the other half to role Y. Participants were exposed
to two distinct game types over two experimental rounds, with no feedback in
between. Specically, 32 participants were assigned to the sequence V ! I, 32
participants to the sequence I ! V , 32 participants to the sequence P ! U,
and 32 participants to the sequence U ! P. Thus, each game type (V , I, P,
and U) was played rst in one session.
Players X could choose a pie size  in the range from e8 to e24 and the
xed share  of Player Y was set equal to e6. Participants received a fee of
e2.50 for showing up on time.
3 Results
3.1 Data Pooling
Before presenting a detailed analysis of the behavior of Players X and Y, we
check whether it is possible to pool the data for the same game type, irrespec-
tively of whether it was played rst or second.
Table 1 reports on the average  chosen by Players X for each game type
and for both orders.
[Table 1 about here]
4For a translated version of the instructions see Appendix A
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check whether the same Player X changed her choice of  from one game type
to the other. If the number of changes is not statistically dierent when the
order of game types changes, we conclude that order does not matter and feel
entitled to pool data for the same game type.
Both when comparing alternative orders for V and I and for P and U, no
statistical dierence is observed in the frequency of changes from one game
type to the other (Fisher's Exact Test, p-value=1.00 for both comparisons).
Henceforth, we pool data for Player X, irrespectively of the order in which they
were elicited.
For Player Y we follow a similar strategy to identify possible order eects.
Table 2 reports on the average rejection rate (%) for each game type and for
both orders.
[Table 2 about here]
To test whether there are spillovers from one game type to the other, we
compute the dierences between the choices reported by the same Player Y in
the two game types. Both when comparing V and I and P and U, the number
of changes in behavior does not statistically dier for dierent elicitation orders
(Pearson's Chi-squared test, p-values=0.086 and p-values=0.364, respectively).
Thus, also for Player Y, the analysis reported below is conducted by pooling
data.
3.2 Player Y
Figure 1 displays the rejection rate for each potential  proposed by Player X
in the four experimental games.
[Figure 1 about here]
As shown by the gure, rejection rates are smaller when rejection is self-
damaging than when it is not. When rejection is other-damaging, higher re-
jection rates are observed for higher , with the highest rejection rate in P
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observed, as suggested by the \more noise hypotheses". Finally, when rejection
is purely self-damaging (I), very few rejections are observed. Statistically sig-
nicant dierences in the rejection proles are detected only when comparing
game types in which rejection is self-damaging (I and U) with game types in
which rejections are not self-damaging (V and P).5
Result 1 For higher claims of Player X, rejections are frequently observed when
they are other-damaging. Rejections are either more erratic or almost absent
when rejection is symbolic or self-damaging.
Result 1 suggests that payo consequences are an important determinant
of Player Y's decision. In light of the behavioral predictions of Section 2.2,
Result 1 suggests that envy is an important motivational factor, although het-
erogeneity in behavior is observed. That not all players are motivated by envy
is demonstrated by the fact that pies  > 18 are accepted by about half of the
participants in P.
To gain in the understanding of Player Y's behavior, a regression analysis
is presented in Table 3. The dependent variable in the generalized linear mixed
model is the decision of Player Y to accept or reject the proposed pie size
. Concerning the explanatory variables, the consequences of the rejection are
captured by two dichotomous variables, Self harming and Other harming. The
former is equal to 1 when rejection entails no earnings for Player Y and equal
to 0 otherwise. The latter is equal to 1 when rejection entails no earnings for
Player X and equal to 0 otherwise. Pie size  is captured by the variable
Pie size. In our estimation we also control for the interactions between the
consequences of rejection and the pie size . Finally, some background control
variables are taken into account: Age, measures the age of Player Y in years;
5 A Wilcoxon signed rank test is employed when comparing V and I and P and U. The
p-values for these comparisons are 0:002 and 0:001, respectively. A Wilcoxon rank sum test
is employed when comparing V and U and I and P. The p-values for these comparisons
are 0:024 and < 0:001, respectively. For all other comparisons, a Wilcoxon rank sum test is
employed and all p-values are > 0:062.
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controls for gender.6
In Table 3, we present three distinct estimations for distinct intervals of
. The intervals capture alternative levels of inequity: over the interval 8{
12 choices of X are more than fair; over the interval 13{18 choices of X are
moderately unfair; over the interval 19{24 choices of X are unfair.
[Table 3 about here]
For the interval 8{12, Table 3 shows that it is less likely to observe a rejection
when rejection is payo-relevant than when it is not, in particular when the cost
of rejection is borne by Player Y. Similarly, for the moderately unfair interval
13{18, rejection is less likely when it is payo relevant than when it is not.
However, the likelihood of a rejection increases as  increases when the damages
of rejection are harming Player X. Also for the interval 19{24, larger pies are
more likely rejected.
Result 2 For fair and unfair choices of Player X, rejection is chosen more
parsimoniously when it bears payo consequences. As soon as the unfairness of
the allocation increases with pie size , more rejections are observed when the
negative consequences of rejection are borne by Player X.
3.3 Player X
Figure 2 provides a description of the frequency (%) of each pie size  for the
four experimental games.
[Figure 2 about here]
In each game type most Players X choose the maximal  and no Player X
chooses a pie size  < 12. However, when the rejection is payo damaging for
6In an exploratory analysis, a model with interactions between Self harming and Other
harming was also estimated. However, this model did not provide a better t than the one
reported here and was also inferior in terms of AIC and BIC measures. Thus, we report here
only the model with single interactions.
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the distribution of  seems to be stronger for game type P. When testing for
the number of choices that are equal to max , game type P statistically diers
both from V and I (Fisher's Exact Test, p-value= 0.011 and p-value= 0.032,
respectively).
Result 3 The large majority of Players X choose the maximal . However,
in game type P, in which rejection is other-damaging but not self-damaging,
the maximal  is chosen less frequently than in game types V and I, in which
rejection is not other-damaging.
The choice that maximizes the expected payo of X, given the choices of Y,
diers from  = 24 only for P. Here, the choice with the highest expected value
is  = 23, with expected earnings equal to e8.5. Players X seem to anticipate
the high rejection rates in P, but only partially adapt their behavior. In the
other games, most Players X choose the maximal  = 24.
3.4 Agreements
As shown above, Players X do not fully anticipate the rejection patterns of
Players Y and mostly choose the maximal . Table 4 provides a representation
of the number of agreements achieved and of the consequences of disagreement
in terms of actual earnings in the experiment.
[Table 4 about here]
The highest number of rejected choices is observed in P, which is also the
game registering the highest losses in terms of payos. For P and U, a statis-
tically signicant loss with respect to the most ecient monetary outcome is
observed (Wilcoxon signed rank test, both p   values < 0:001). For V and I,
no signicant deviation from the most ecient monetary outcome is registered
(Wilcoxon signed rank test, p-value=0.371 and p-value=0:097, respectively).
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choices of Players X. This generates signicant welfare losses. Interestingly,
welfare losses are higher when they are entirely borne by Player X than when
they are shared by both players.
4 Conclusion
Previous studies propagated the role of envy, in itself or as a component of
inequity aversion, based on ndings for situations in which there is a trade-o
between the payo of one party and that of its counterpart (for a review of
such results see Camerer, 2003). In the Envy Game players are locally not com-
peting for scarce resources, notwithstanding envy has important detrimental
consequences, both individually and socially. A comparison of our results with
those of Gueth et al. (201x) suggests that envy is not simply triggered by out-
come inequalities, as predicted by consequentialist or allocation-based models
(e.g., Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000), but is also aected
by the process leading to the disadvantageous allocation. When the disadvanta-
geous situation is created by the suering decision maker herself, like in Gueth
et al. (201x), envy seems to be dominated by eciency concerns. When the
disadvantageous situation is imposed by another party, like in the Envy Game,
envy seems to beat eciency seeking. This nding may help us to understand
real-life interactions and will hopefully improve the modeling of social prefer-
ences.
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Table 1: Average  depending on order of game type





Table 2: Average rejection rate (%) depending on order of game type






Jena Economic Research Papers 2011 - 051Table 3: Choices of Player Y (Generalized linear mixed model)
Coe (Std. Err.)
Rejection  2 f8;:::12g  2 f13;:::18g  2 f19;:::24g
(Intercept) 0.531 (8.398) -0.634 (6.489) 1.325 (9.450)
Self harming -3.883 (1.278)** -6.093 (2.150)** -1.306 (3.426)
Other harming -4.250 (2.269) -6.037 (2.246)** -4.208 (3.994)
Pie size -0.217 (0.222) 0.088 (0.141) -0.051 (0.155)
Self harmingPie size -0.142 (0.399) 0.194 (0.232) -0.267 (0.242)
Other harmingPie size 0.441 (0.351) 0.668 (0.199)*** 0.509 (0.240)*
Age -0.124 (0.328) -0.092 (0.248) -0.186 (3.527)
Econ -1.762 (2.955) -4.963 (3.885) -1.881 (3.527)
Female -1.459 (1.821) -0.140 (1.358) 0.258 (1.852)
Obs (Subj) 640 (64) 768 (64) 768 (64)
Prob > chi2 < 0:001 < 0:001 < 0:001
(0:1%); (1%); (5%); (10%) signicance level
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Game type
V I P U
Actually accepted  (%) 68.7 96.9 56.2 71.9
Y's average earnings 6.000 5.812 6.000 4.312
X's average earnings 17.719 17.375 7.188 10.969
Loss of social welfare (%) 1.2 3.4 45.1 36.3
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Experimental Instructions (General)
[Note: Same for all game types]
Thank you for taking part in this experiment. You receive e2.50 for showing
up on time. In addition, a certain amount of money will be paid as a result
of the decisions made in the experiment. During the experiment, you are not
allowed to talk to other participants. Whenever you have a question, please
raise your hand and an experimenter will come to answer your question. Please
remain silent and switch o your mobile phone. If you violate these rules, we
will have to exclude you from the experiment and all payments. To simplify
the reading of the instructions we are going to use the masculine grammatical
gender. However, the instructions are to be interpreted as gender neutral.
The experiment is composed of two parts. You receive instructions for the
second part only at the end of the rst part. In each part you can earn an
amount of Euros. However, only one part is going to be randomly selected for
the actual payment. You will know which part has been selected for payment
only after the experiment. Your nal payo will be paid privately in cash after
the experiment.
In this experiment, two participants will interact. The two members of a pair
will be randomly assigned to one of two roles: X or Y . Your role is the same in
the two parts. Your identity will not be revealed to any other participant. You
are informed of the choices of the other in part 1 only at the end of part 2. The
other is informed of your choices in part 1 only at the end of part 2.
Experimental Instructions (Round)
Choices
[Note: same for all game types]
Each pair can share a positive amount of Euros. In the following, we shall
refer to the monetary amount which X and Y can share as the \pie" and denote
it by p. The size of the pie can be between e8 and e24, in steps of e1.
Each X-participant in the pair chooses the size of the pie (p). What Y can
get from p is xed whereas X is the residual claimant. More specically, the
Y-participant can receive the xed amount e6, while X receives the residual
(ep   6).
X-participants choose the size of the pie by selecting the amount in the
following table
The Y-participant in the pair can decide whether to accept or reject the
choice by the participant X. The participant Y makes her choice for all possible
oers before knowing the actual choice made by participant X. Thus, the Y-
participant has to ll in the following table:
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ing the corresponding cell. For each column, one cell only must be chosen.
Payos
After X-participant and Y-participant made their choices, the payos are com-
puted by matching the choice of the X-participant with the corresponding choice
of Y-participant. Participants are informed about the choice made by the other
at the end of the experiment (when the second part is over).
[Note: this is the version for game type V . Other game types are obtained
by changing the instructions accordingly.]
When the Y-participant accepts the choice p of the X-participant, the payos
are as follows: the X-participant gets ep   6, the Y-participants gets e6.
When the Y-participants rejects the choice p of the X-participant, the payos
are as follows: the X-participant gets ep   6, the Y-participant gets e6. Thus,
although X will learn that Y has rejected, the rejection by Y has no monetary
consequences.
The following table provides a summary of the earnings for each possible
choice made by X- and Y- participants.
X chooses Y accepts Y rejects
p X earns Y earns X earns Y earns
8 2 6 2 6
9 3 6 3 6
10 4 6 4 6
11 5 6 5 6
12 6 6 6 6
13 7 6 7 6
14 8 6 8 6
15 9 6 9 6
16 10 6 10 6
17 11 6 11 6
18 12 6 12 6
19 13 6 13 6
20 14 6 14 6
21 15 6 15 6
22 16 6 16 6
23 17 6 17 6
24 18 6 18 6
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To guide our intuition about behavior in the envy game, we consider a version
of Charness and Rabin (2002)'s model of distributional preferences. For Player
Y, the \social utility" has the following functional form
UY (x;y) =

(1   )y + x if y  x
(1   )y + x if y < x
where ; are coecients capturing concerns for other's welfare; X and Y
are the monetary payos of the two players.
A general assumption is that the subjects have monotonic preferences so
that @
@yUY () > 0. This is obtained by assuming ;  < 1. In addition
to this, alternative restrictions can be imposed on the parameters  and  to
capture dierent preference structures. Here we consider four alternative social
preference types to predict behavior in alternative versions of the Envy Game:
 Selsh ( =  = 0): the utility of a selsh player is strictly increasing in
her own payo and independent of the payo of the other.
{ Impunity: () = 1 8 
{ Punity: (() = 1j() = 0) 8 
{ Ultimatum: () = 1 8 
 Dierence-averse ( < 0 <  < 1): the utility of a dierence-averse
player is decreasing (increasing) in her (other's) payo when she is better
o than the other; the utility is increasing (decreasing) in her (other's)
payo when she is worse o than the other.
{ Impunity: For   2, the acceptance condition is (1 )y+x >
x. This is always true given that (1   ) > 0 and  > . For
 > 2, the condition of acceptance is given by (1 )y+x > x.
This implies that (1 )y > 0, a condition that is always met given
that  < 0. Thus, () = 1 8 .
{ Punity: For   2, the acceptance condition (1   )y + x >
(1   )y is always fullled as  > 0. For  > 2, a choice of  is
accepted as long as (1 )y+x > (1 )y. From this one obtains




since  < 0. Given that x =    , the





the stronger the envy, as measured by jj, the lower the rejection
threshold of . In contrast, a stronger sense of guilt, as measured
by , induces a higher rejection threshold. For this game type, the
highest  accepted is dened by the interaction between  and .
However, when envy is stronger than guilt, as it is assumed by other
social preference models (e.g., Fehr and Schmidt, 1999), all  > 3
are going to be rejected, independently of the values of  and .
{ Ultimatum: For   2, a  is accepted if (1   )y + x > 0.
Given that 0 <  < 1, any   2 is going to be accepted. For
 > 2, the acceptance conditions is (1   )y + x > 0. In terms




. Whether  is
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 <  6 all  > 2 are rejected, while for  1=2 <  < 0 all  > 2
are accepted.
 Welfare-enhancing (1     > 0): for a player inclined to enhance
welfare, a higher payo for herself (reasonably imposing that 1 >  > 0)
or for the other are always desirable because of  > 0.
{ Impunity: For   2, the acceptance condition (1 )y +(x) >
x is always fullled as long as 1 >  > 0 and   . Similarly,
for  > 2, the acceptance condition (1   )y + (x) > (x) is
always fullled as long as 1 >  > 0. Thus, () = 1 8 .
{ Punity: For   2, the acceptance condition (1   )y + x >
(1   )y is always fullled as  > 0. Similarly, for  > 2, the
acceptance condition (1   )y + x > (1   )y is always fullled
as  > 0 and   . Thus, () = 1 8 .
{ Ultimatum: For   2, the acceptance condition (1 )y+x > 0
is always fullled as long as 1 >  > 0. Similarly, for  > 2, the
acceptance condition (1   )y + x > 0 is always fullled as long
as 1 >  > 0. Thus, () = 1 8 .
 Competitive (    0): the utility of a player with competitive prefer-
ences decreases when the payo of the other increases and increases when
her payo increases.
{ Impunity: For   2, the acceptance condition (1   )y + x >
x is always fullled given the restrictions on  and . Similarly, for
 > 2, the acceptance condition (1   )y + x > x is always
fullled as long as   0. Thus, () = 1 8 .
{ Punity: For   2, the acceptance condition (1   )y + x >
(1   )y is never fullled as   0. For  > 2, the acceptance





. Given that ; < 0, the condition is never satised
for  > 2.
{ Ultimatum: For   2, the acceptance condition is (1 )y+x >
0. In terms of  and assuming  < 0, the condition can be stated




. The rejection threshold is always bigger than
2 and, thus, any   2 is accepted. For  > 2, the acceptance
conditions is (1   )y + (x) > 0. In terms of  and assuming





 > 2, the acceptance of a choice depends upon the strength of
envy.
Concerning Player X, the allocational preferences considered here predict
the choice of  =  for any game type. This is obtained from the fact that
0 <  < 1 (in our game this seems a reasonable assumption also for someone
with welfare enhancing preferences). Thus, a Player X has always a positive
marginal incentive in increasing her residual claim.
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Game type Prediction  Interval
Selsh
I () = 1 
P () = f0;1g 
U () = 1 
Dierence-averse
I () = 1 
P () = 1   2
() = F






U () = 1   2
() = F







I () = 1 
P () = 1 
U () = 1 
Competitive
I () = 1 
P () = 0 
U () = 1   2
() = F






Note: F() = 1 if the condition () is fullled, otherwise F() = 0.
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